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We  are  entering  an  autumn  season  which  appears  to  promise one
of  the  liveliest  and  most  virulent  debates  on  foreign  policy  in  years.
Until  recently  the  Kennedy administration  has  been blessed  by a  situa-
tion  as  closely  approximating  a  bipartisan  foreign  policy  as  anything
prevailing  during  the last decade.  Except for not very  effective attacks
from  the  extreme  right  wing,  the  administration  may  be said  to  have
enjoyed  broad  support  for  its  policies  in  the  international  field.  Even
the  fiasco  of  the Bay of  Pigs was  not exploited  by  opposition  elements
to any great  extent.
In  view  of  this  comparative  union sacree  in  the  area  of  foreign
affairs,  the situation  which  now appears  to be developing is disturbing.
As  the  electoral  campaign  progresses,  we  see  prospects  of  a  violent
and  abusive  political  debate  in which  the central  focus may  be on for-
eign  affairs.  As the outcome  of the election  has become more  doubtful
controversy  has  sharpened.  The  temptation  to  "go  for  broke"  and
exploit  every  workable  angle  is constantly  increasing.  Also,  the Amer-
ican  public  has  recently  been  subjected  to  a  series  of  shocks  and  a
multiplication  of  frustrations.  The  Berlin  pot,  perpetually  simmering,
gives  every  indication  of  coming  to  another  boil  in  the  near  future.
The  most  recent  Soviet  space  feat  involving  two  vehicles  has  been  a
real  shocker.  It  shattered  a  partially  restored  complacency  during
which  a  big  question  was  who  was ahead  of whom and  in what.  Cer-
tainly it has been another blow to our national poise and self-confidence.
Lastly,  but  by  no means  least,  recent weeks  have  witnessed  a surge  of
reports  about  various  types  of  actual  or  supposed  Soviet  "build-up"
in  Cuba.  This  is the  kind  of  threat,  within  our  own  hemisphere  and
virtually at our front door, which  no American needs explained  to him.
For  once,  in  a  situation  where  we face  the  Soviets  we  do  so in  close
conformity  with  an  established national  tradition.
During the  last months the focus has been centered somewhat more
on specific  issues  than  it  was previously.  In  1961  we  witnessed  a  mad
scramble  in world  affairs  with  the  spotlight  shifting  crazily  back  and
forth between Laos, Cuba, the Congo, South Vietnam,  Algeria,  Berlin,
the  affairs  of  the  U. N.,  nuclear  testing,  and  disarmament  talks.  We
can,  of  course,  never  be  sure  that tomorrow's  headlines  will not  sud-
denly highlight  an area relegated  to the back pages for months.  But on
3the  whole more interest has probably been concentrated on three prob-
lems  than on all the rest  combined.  I  am thinking of Berlin, Cuba,  and
the  growth  and external  relationships  of the  Common  Market.  These
all  have  certain aspects  of life-and-death  issues  for us and for the West
generally.  Most  disturbing  is the  thought-that  the  national  debate  con-
cerning  them  should  develop  in  an  atmosphere  of  exasperation,  irre-
sponsibility,  and occasional  signs of hysteria.
In  particular,  pressures  continue  to mount  for  "doing  something."
We  are  an  impatient  and  action-loving  people  whose  national  slogan,
if we can be said to have one, is,  "Don't just stand there, do something."
At times we seem  to demand action for action's sake.  I am reminded of
a Punch cartoon  of  1956,  when  the  British  mood  concerning  us  was
on  the  critical  side,  showing  Uncle  Sam  running  around  aimlessly.
Britannia,  or  John  Bull,  or  whoever  it  was  stood  on the  sidelines  ad-
monishing  him,  "Don't just do something,  stand there."  In some  situa-
tions,  such  as  that  prevailing  in recent  years  in  the  Middle  East,  this
kind  of  cautious,  wait-and-see  policy  has  paid  substantial  dividends.
This  does  not  mean that  such  a  policy should  be applied  wholesale  as
a  formula  for  success  in  international  relations.  But  it  does  underline
that  in  the  absence  of  clearly  obtainable  objectives,  marking  time  is
better than action for action's sake.
An example  of  a type  of undiscriminating  and rather  irresponsible
demand  for  action  is to  be  found  in  the frequent  talk  about  "reverse
salami."  Willy  Brandt's descriptive reference  to Soviet tactics of moving
one  step  at  a  time  and  never  going  quite  far  enough  to  invite  a  real
showdown  is here  perverted.  First  of  all,  those  who  demand  action
strongly  imply that  under both  the Eisenhower  and  Kennedy adminis-
trations,  perhaps  under Truman,  opportunities  for positive action have
been  lying  around  neglected.  They make  a  complacent  assumption  of
numerous  vulnerabilities  in  the  Soviet  world  position  which  we  have
left unexploited.  Rarely  do they  make specific  suggestions  about where
we should  begin  the  slicing  process.  Insofar  as  concrete  proposals  are
made  for "taking the initiative,"  they illustrate how little the concept  of
"salami  slicing"  is  understood.  The term,  correctly  used, embodies  the
notion  of taking  only such steps  as involve  no serious  danger of world
conflict.  Clearly  such drastic  proposals as  invading  or totally blockad-
ing Cuba do not properly fit such  a definition.
On  the  other  extreme  of  the  scale  are  demands  for  "action"  that
have  more  resemblance  to publicity stunts  than  to genuine  strengthen-
ing  of  Western  positions.  What we  need  are  not  so  much  maneuvers
to win propaganda victories over petty issues like the use of Checkpoint
Charley  as  the consistent demonstration  of firmness in established posi-
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has  been  at  the center  of what  could  be called  the  Second  Cold  War
as launched  by the second Berlin crisis in 1958. This new era of tension
sprang from a deliberate Soviet decision. Certainly  no compelling  initia-
tive  on our part set matters  in motion.  However much free Berlin may
be  a bone that Khrushchev  is determined  to get out of his throat, noth-
ing novel  in  1958  drove  him to action.
The  only  claim  of  this nature  that has  come to my  attention is that
German  rearmament  just  about  then  became  sufficiently  impressive
to  arouse anxieties  in the Kremlin.  That the Soviets  do not rejoice  over
the  new  German  army  is comprehensible  enough.  The  building  of  a
German  military  force  has  been  about  the  only  bright  spot in  the
NATO  picture  for half a  decade.  The  addition  of the German  contin-
gent  to the NATO ground forces has for the first time made conceivable
a  serious  defensive  posture  in  Central  Europe.  Provided  with  tactical
nuclear  weapons,  which  clearly  require  a  good  deal  of  elbow  room,
some  twenty-five  to thirty divisions  might actually  represent something
like  a  saturation  point on  a comparatively  narrow front.  On the  other
hand,  this  level  of strength  would  have  no significance  whatever  from
an  offensive  standpoint,  for  it  would  quickly  become  dissipated  when
fanned  out  over  the  vast spaces  of Eastern  Europe.  Germany's  contri-
bution,  like  the NATO  forces  in  general,  therefore,  has  meaning  only
from a purely defensive standpoint.
If  Khrushchev  professes  that  he  is  "afraid"  of a  German  army,  it
thus can be only in the  sense of that peculiar  Kremlin dictionary which
contains  definitions  that  seldom  agree  with  accepted  Western  defini-
tions.  His  fear would concern  the  West's ability  to put up some kind of
defense  in  the  area  of  "conventional"  warfare,  an ability  which  is sure
to  be  reflected  in  a  diplomatic  confrontation  rendered  more favorable
to  us because our military eggs are  no longer exclusively in the nuclear
basket.
Khrushchev  put his case  somewhat  differently  in a  talk with Prime
Minister  Eden in  1956.  At that time he declared  that he felt no anxiety
about the  United  States and  Britain launching  an  attack or about Ger-
many  doing  so by herself.  What  he feared,  he said,  was  German confi-
dence  being  sufficiently  stimulated  by  Western  backing  to  lead  to
military  adventures.  Germany  would,  of  course,  then  quickly  be
smashed  into a  radio-active  waste,  but World War III would be under-
way.  The  answer  to this  is that no one  recognizes  their military  limita-
tions  more  than  the  Germans  and  that,  if  they  needed  enlightening,
Khrushchev  saw to that quite thoroughly when he told Socialist leaders
Schmid  and  Erler in  1959 that just  two hydrogen  bombs  would  more
than take care of Germany.
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most persistent  Soviet motive in periodically  bringing that pot to a boil
is  to  sow  confusion  and  disunity in Western  ranks.  Assuredly Khrush-
chev has repeatedly  drawn heavy dividends from these tactics.  Not only
has  it  proved  impossible  for  the  Atlantic  powers  to ever  achieve  any-
thing  like  a  completely  solid  front on  this  issue, but  also each country
has had  internal  dissension  and uncertainty.  Even  in the United States,
where  recognition  of  the  vital  importance  of  Berlin  is  fairly  general,
the  results of national  and  local  polls on such  questions  as whether we
should  "risk" war  for Berlin  have  fluctuated widely.  The endless diplo-
matic  "probing"  and  the  desperate  search  (notably in the  summer and
autumn  of  1961)  for concessions  that  might  be offered  to the  Soviets
are  other  examples  of  what  President  de Gaulle  has  with some  justice
characterized  as  a  Western  loss  of  poise.  If  Khrushchev's  imagination
failed  him  with  respect  to  demands  to  make on  Berlin and other Ger-
man  questions,  he  would  not  be stymied  by  lack  of suggestions  from
American  press and broadcasting  commentators.
However  much  they  may  be  more  apparent  than  real,  the  confu-
sion  and  occasional  contradictions  of  official  American  statements  has
combined  with  those  from  private  sources  to  create  in  Germany  a
suspicion  that  American  policy  is "softening"  on the  Berlin issue.  This
is  the  more  regrettable  because  we  really  have  little  or  nothing  in the
way  of alternatives  here.  Certainly  this  is  one  of those  East-West  con-
frontations  where  the  chances  for  "reverse  salami"  are  most  notable
for their absence.  We have no perceivable  hope even of recovering  any
of  the  ground  most  recently  lost,  such  as  by  the  building  of  the  in-
famous wall  in August  of 1961.
Will talking with the Russians about Berlin, then, serve no purpose?
Is  my  perhaps  somewhat  unenthusiastic  reference  to  "probes"  to  be
interpreted  as  a  slur  on  all  efforts  to  negotiate?  That,  most decidedly,
is  not the  meaning  I  have  sought  to convey.  I  do  feel  that negotiation
attended  by  publicity  implying  a  confidence  that  positive  results  are
attainable can only confuse our own people and create internal Western
tensions,  especially  between  us  and  West  Germany.  I  am  convinced
that nothing  we could possibly  afford to offer Khrushchev could  induce
him  to renounce so good  a  thing as this  apple of discord he keeps toss-
ing into the Western camp.
Yet  negotiation  can  help  materially  toward  gaining  the  one  thing
that  perhaps  is  attainable  for  us-keeping  Khrushchev  from  further
risky  steps  that  threaten  major  conflict  or,  even  better,  enabling  him
to refrain from making them.  Having so often set deadlines and spoken
in  ultimative  terms,  even  this  near-dictator  has  a  face-saving  problem
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impasse  is  reached,  the  pressure  on  him  to  resume  doing  things  be-
comes  almost  irresistible.  On  the  other  hand,  as  we  keep  on  talking,
he  can very  plausibly claim  a virtue  in  holding his dogs  in  leash  while
efforts  to reach an understanding  continue.
The second  problem  I have  stressed  is Cuba.  Unrelated  as the two
questions  appear  to  be,  Cuba and  Berlin promise to  tie in rather  signi-
ficantly.  (And  this  seems  most  probable  in  a  way  opposite  to  that
which  has  been  most  often  conjectured.)  Some  people  in  the  West,
especially  in Germany,  believe that Cuba, being so obviously  a primary
"American"  concern,  will  increasingly  engage  our  interests  and  emo-
tions  at the  cost of vigor in dealing with issues  that are  more remote  to
our national  consciousness.  Official American statements  on Berlin  are
carefully  scrutinized  for  signs  of  a  "softening"  inspired  by  Cuban
worries.  Apprehension  has  actually  been  voiced  that  we  might  yet
sacrifice  Berlin to  Khrushchev  in return  for his  selling out  Cuba.
Such  calculations  are  closely  associated  with  European  failure  to
understand  fully  the  reasons  for our restraints  in dealing  with  Cuba-
a  failure  I  had occasion  to  note  in many  quarters  when  last  in Europe
in  1960. Instead  of appreciating  our fear of defeating our own purposes
and  actually  spreading  Castroism  by  premature  action  in  Cuba,  the
feeling  seemed  to  be  that we  were  terrified  by  the  threats  of Khrush-
chev.  Actually,  aside  from  our anxiety  about reactions  in Latin Amer-
ica,  our  fear  should  be  that  Khrushchev's  response  to  an  invasion  of
Cuba  could  be the  drastic  move  at  Berlin  he has  thus  far hesitated  to
take.  It  could  then  be  launched  in  a  climate  of  world  opinion-even
among  our  allies-that  could  leave  us  largely  isolated.  We  might  well
recall here  the similar sinister association of Suez and Hungary in  1956.
As  is so  much  the case with  Berlin,  the Cuban  situation  is particu-
larly  notable  for  the  degree  to  which  it must  be played  by ear.  In  the
various  statements  made  by  the President,  the  crux  of the  administra-
tion's  policy  lies  in  the pledge  that  we  shall  neither  initiate  nor permit
aggression  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  This  amounts  to  saying  that
until  a  more  clearly  developed  aggressive  posture  is evident  in  Cuba,
we  shall  hold our fire  while  keeping our  powder very  dry.  It may also
be  assumed  that  the  drastic  blockade  now  demanded  in irresponsible
quarters  is subject  to  the  same taboo.  What  we  may  do meanwhile  in
the way  of persuading  our allies  to join in embargo  actions,  arming  or
enlisting  Cuban  refugees,  and enlisting  the sympathy  or support of the
Latin  Americans  probably  represents  the  best  course  available  to  us
as we watch and wait.
We  now  come  to  our  third  major  topic:  the  current  integrative
7efforts  of  the  West  concerning  the  Common  Market.  The  Western
mountain is  again in labor. It is clearly capable this time of giving birth
to something  very substantial.  Among the  hazards,  on the  other hand,
is  less  the  prospect  of  bringing  forth  a  mouse  than  a  Frankenstein
monster.  This  is  one  of those  questions  where  we are  little concerned
with Soviet initiatives  or interference.  The  issue involves action almost
completely  confined  within  the  "family,"  and we can  only  blame our-
selves  if  we  do  not handle  it  effectively.  Most fundamentally  we  face
two problems.  The  first  of  these  is  the  mobilization  and coordination
of the resources  of the  West, potentially  four times  those which  can be
mobilized by  the Soviet Union. The second  is the development  of inter-
national  institutions to promote Western  integration.
Looking  at  these  in  reverse  order,  we  face  a  world  development
in which catastrophe threatens  to  become inevitable  if nations  continue
to  dispose  independently  of  weapons  capable  of  endangering  human
existence.  The  long-range  basic  validity  of  the  slogan,  "One  world
or none,"  is  difficult  to  deny.  Yet  my  considered  view  is  that a world
half slave  and  half  free  and,  even  more  important,  in which  one  side
is  utterly  committed  against  toleration  of political  diversity,  offers  no
prospect  of  progressing  toward  a  stronger  world  order.  Discouraging
as  the outlook  may  be, the  realistic  view  is that we will  do better  than
we  probably  have  a right  to hope  if we can prevent  further weakening
of the United Nations.
Hopelessness  and  resignation  about  a  positive  development  of the
present  world  order  does  not  mean  we can  do nothing  but mark time.
Great  as  are  the  obstacles  and difficulties,  no compelling  reasons  pre-
vent  steady  progress  in  gradually  fusing  the  Atlantic  community  into
the  kind  of  system  that  could  at  some  future  date  be  elevated  to  a
higher and broader  plane.  Though we  cannot develop  the point now, a
strong  argument  could  also  be  made  for  the  view  that  the  need  for
Atlantic  unity would be as great or greater  if the Soviet threat  subsided
than  it  is now.  Meanwhile,  it would  assure  us  of  a  colossal  dividend
in  the  form  of  an  infinitely  more  effective  coordination  of  Western
resources  in relation  to all East-West  confrontations.
The  wastage of Western resources  due to lack of coordinated effort
has increased  in close proportion to the growth of resources  capable  of
being  squandered.  By  far  the  most  scandalous  and greatest  failure  in
Western policy has  been the inability to arrive at an understanding  with
respect  to  the  production  and  control  of  nuclear  weapons  and  the
means  for  their  delivery.  It  has  caused  continual  wear  and  tear  in
Western  relations  and an  incredible  duplication  of  effort  and expendi-
ture.  Questionable  as  is the  ultimate  implementation  of  France's  ex-
8travagant  program to create by the end of the decade a nuclear  striking
force  scheduled  to  cost  120  billion  dollars,  the  fact  that  it  could  be
conceived  and  bullied  through  the  French  parliament  is  sufficiently
eloquent  of this  situation.
Equally  frustrating  is  the inability  of the  major Western powers  to
reach anything like a common position on negotiation for arms control.
Relations  among the  Atlantic  allies have  deteriorated  in these matters
to  where  actual  tensions  have  sprung  from  the  Kennedy  administra-
tion's efforts to  rebuild our "conventional"  forces.  Instead of the Euro-
pean  welcome  these measures  deserved,  they aroused  in some  quarters
a  suspicion,  difficult  to  eradicate  entirely,  that  we  are  contemplating
a  "nuclear  withdrawal."
All  of  this  bears  in  some  measure  on  the  broader  problem  of
Western  integration.  We  can  easily  decide  today  whether,  in  sum,  we
are  moving  forward  or  backward  in  this  vital  area.  The  progress  of
Common  Market  relationships  has  provided  a  paradoxical  combina-
tion  of  glittering  opportunities  and grim  hazards.  We  cannot  dwell  on
the  many  angles,  the  countless  wheels  within  wheels,  the  complicated
role  of  the  various  nations,  groups of countries,  and national  leaders.
On  the  negative  side  have  been  evidences  of  a  growing  "European
nationalism"  and  of  an  inclination  of  the  core  group  to  cash  in  self-
interestedly  on the economic  gains  thus far assured.  Not inconceivable
is the  possibility  that  Britain  might  be  left  on  the  doorstep,  that  the
Common Market  would play "hard  to get"  with  the United States,  and
that  the  vital  interests  of  the  Latin  Americans,  the  emerging  nations,
and the  Japanese  would  be  passed  over.  Such  a  course  of "European
isolationism"  could  throw  the  Free  World  into  a  state  of  economic
civil  war.
Conversely,  if  Britain  and the  peripheral  states  of Europe  are  tied
in,  and  if  a  true  partnership  relation  is promoted  with  the  United
States,  Khrushchev's  threats  of  "burying"  us  by  superior  production
will  be  demoted  to  silly  bluster.  Communism  has  already  been  dealt
one  of  the  heaviest  blows  in  its  history  by  the  manner  in  which  the
Common  Market  has  demonstrated  the  resilience  of  Western  capital-
ism  and  its  ability  to  adjust  in  meeting  the  problems  of  a  changing
society.
At  this  stage  the  problem  here  delineated  hardly  leaves  room  for
serious  alternatives  for  American  policy.  We  have  some  choice  of
tactics  and  can  make  our  particular  contribution  to  decisions  on  the
nature  and scope  of the  association,  the role  of  the European  neutrals
(Sweden,  Austria,  and Switzerland),  and the arrangements  made with
non-European  nations.  Clearly  the  President  will  need  the  ultimate  in
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our  European  friends  on  these  matters.  Fortunately  Congress  now
shows  every  prospect  of providing  him with the  instruments  he needs.
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